Type Alias DisabledReason

Type declaration

• { detail?: string; filter: string; kind: "filter-failed" }

  • Optionaldetail?: string

  • filter: string

  • kind: "filter-failed"

    The action's condition evaluated falsy for this actor — the ONE engine-side gate (advisory, like every engine check). Sugar like roles desugared into this condition, so a role miss surfaces here too. Under filter-existence semantics a consumer renders the action ABSENT, never disabled.
• { kind: "cascade-fired"; when: string }

  • kind: "cascade-fired"

    The action is cascade-fired (when) — the engine's cascade is its only firing path; fireAction rejects it for every caller.

  • when: string

• { kind: "activity-not-active"; status: TerminalActivityStatus }
• { kind: "stage-terminal"; stage: StageName }
• { denied: DeniedGuardRef[]; kind: "mutation-guard-denied" }

  • denied: DeniedGuardRef[]

  • kind: "mutation-guard-denied"

    A deployed mutation guard denies the instance write every action commit performs. Advisory pre-flight — the engine's optimistic evaluation; denied is the same DeniedGuardRef shape the thrown MutationGuardDeniedError carries.
• { completedAt: string; kind: "instance-completed" }
• { abortedAt: string; kind: "instance-aborted" }

  • abortedAt: string

  • kind: "instance-aborted"

    The instance was hard-stopped via abortInstance. Aborted instances carry completedAt too, so this arm wins over instance-completed (the terminalState precedence).
• { kind: "requirements-unmet"; unmetRequirements: RequirementDescriptor[] }

  • kind: "requirements-unmet"

    The activity's declared Activity.requirements aren't all satisfied — the readiness axis. The activity is visible and the actor authorized, but its own preconditions don't hold yet. unmetRequirements carries the authored descriptors so a consumer can disable the affirmative control and say which precondition is outstanding. Distinct from filter-failed (visibility/authorization) and mutation-guard-denied (content-write).

  • unmetRequirements: RequirementDescriptor[]

• { denied: SubjectPermissionDenial[]; kind: "subject-permission-denied" }

  • denied: SubjectPermissionDenial[]

  • kind: "subject-permission-denied"

    The actor's grants on an involved subject's resource don't allow the content write the action's effects would perform there. Forecast per-resource: each subject named by a doc.ref/subject/doc.refs/release.ref field entry outside the workflow's own resource is checked against THAT resource's ACL. Advisory like every engine verdict — the subject's lake still enforces; and it degrades open: a resource whose grants can't be fetched is simply not forecast.